INTRODUCTION
In recent years, financial and political pressures have induced legislators to adopt forms of managed care for Medicaid programs. Rising health care costs, 1 the unpopularity of the Medicaid entitlement to both taxpayers UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 147:1161 AIDS programs."' 13 Nevertheless, "[ilt may be difficult for middle-and upper-class Americans to appreciate that poor people still die in the United States because medical care is refused them."' 4 Many welfare advocates fear that a move to managed care 15 will bring about exactly this result. 16 Although the benefits provided to Medicaid recipients have been shrinking, the legal rights of disabled persons have expanded, especially with the enactment of the ADA in 1990. Building on the ground broken by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in the arenas of employment, public services, and public accommodations.
1 7 Recognizing the historical and continuing isolation and segregation of persons with disabilities, 18 and the potentially devastating 13 Susan H. McBride, The AIDS Cocktail, MANAGED HEALTHCARE, Nov. 1997, at 39. 14 Sparer, supra note 2, at 10 (detailing numerous stories of deaths resulting from lack of medical assistance). 15 Managed care, in contrast to traditional fee-for-service insurance, places extensive limits on both the doctors and services available to the patient. See generally Jane Bennett Clark, A Doctor's-Eye View of Managed Care, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., June 1, 1997, at 87, 88 (stating that the "simple" premise behind MCOs is that "[i]n exchange for either a salary or a prepaid fee for every patient (called a capitated rate), doctors deliver routine and preventive services and manage access to specialists-hence the term 'managed care"). Although some doctors find the arrangement "equitable," others complain that "per-patient rates barely pay for the basics." Id. at 88. Further, critics question the incentive structure, in which
MCOs allocate a lump sum to doctors, out of which the doctors themselves pay specialists when their patients require specialized care--"a pretty horrible system that presents the potential for huge conflicts of interest." Id. (internal quotations omitted). On the other hand, to state governments facing seemingly insurmountable Medicaid expenses, managed care is an attractive solution because MCOs "accept financial risk for the health care they sell. 16 See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 51-52 (suggesting that the "rationing of health care" will impact "who shall live and who shall die," and that "[i]n other cases, rationing can have profound effects on a person's quality of life").
17 See 42 U.S.C. § § 12111-12112 (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination against disabled persons); id. § § 12131-12132 (prohibiting discrimination against disabled persons with respect to access to public services); id. § § 12181-12182 (prohibiting discrimination against disabled persons with respect to public accommodations).
18 See id. § 12101(a) (discussing the discrimination that disabled Americans have historically faced, and that 43,000,000 disabled Americans continue to face today); see also Mark C. .. who are old enough to work are not working; of that group, two-thirds want work," and that " [p] ersons with disabilities leave home to eat, view movies, or participate in public events much less frequently than other members of the general population" (footnotes omitted)).
"benign neglect" of the disabled that saturates American culture, 19 Congress promulgated this broad-reaching statute.
With this expansion of rights on the one hand, and narrowing of benefits on the other, a significant amount of litigation has begun to appear, brought by patients challenging decisions made by state Medicaid agencies or Medicaid MCOs under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. As one commentator put it, "[s]ince its enactment, the ADA is already responsible for a crippling case-load." 2 0 For Medicaid recipients, the relevant provisions of the Act are Title II (public services) 21 and Title III (public accommodations). 22 Under Title II, a state or local government and its instrumentalities cannot exclude from participation in a program or deny services to a person with a disability. 23 Under Title III, a public accommodation cannot discriminate against a disabled person in the full and equal enjoyment of goods and services of the accommodation. 24 Predictably, however, there are a multitude of additional requirements and exceptions affecting whether a state or MCO is responsible when it denies care. A "safe harbor" provision in the ADA blocks suits against insurance companies under Title III, as long as the insurer makes its risk assessment based on sound actuarial principles, and not as a subterfuge to defeat the other purposes of the ADA. 25 A number of courts have held that the public accommodations title applies only to physical accommodations, and because most insured persons never actually visit their insurance company's office, the insurance company does not fall within that ambit. 26 And most significantly, a Medicaid beneficiary can recover for a denial of services only when he or she has been deprived of 19 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) (observing that Congress enacted legislation preceding the ADA to confront discrimination against the disabled that was "most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of beniro neglect").
Matthew W. Daus, MediatingADA Claims, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 18, 1996, at Dl. 21 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (prohibiting the exclusion of disabled persons from participation in public services by reason of their disability).
22 See id. § 12182 (prohibiting the denial of equal access to public accommodations). 23 See id. § 12131-12132 (prohibiting discrimination against disabled persons with respect to access to public services and defining the term "public entity"). 24 See id. § 12182(a) (providing that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation"). 25 See id. § 12201(c) (stating that the Act "shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict" insurers "from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks"). 26 See infra Part III.B (discussing case law on the issue of whether insurance companies are "public accommodations").
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[Vol. 147:1161 "meaningful access" to that benefit. 27 Not all restrictions on access to public services and accommodations are actionable. The issue of whether "meaningful access" to health care exists became the crucial inquiry in determining whether a state agency had discriminated against the disabled plaintiffs in Alexander v. Choate . 28 This widely cited case involved a challenge that Medicaid recipients brought against Tennessee's decision to reduce the yearly cap on reimbursed hospital days from twenty to fourteen. In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the court cited three relevant factors: the limitation did not "have a particular exclusionary effect" on the disabled, the reduction decision was not based on a standard that the disabled were less capable of meeting, and "nothing in the record suggest [ed] that the handicapped will be unable to benefit meaningfully from the coverage they will receive under the 14-day rule." 29 Outside the particular facts of Choate, however, it is uncertain what constitutes "meaningful access," and as a result the federal courts have issued a wide spectrum of decisions. 30 Some courts have gone so far as to conclude that if a recipient of a benefit has any access to the benefit, then that access is meaningful. 31 Other courts suggest a more detailed inquiry into the circumstances, examining whether the defendant has taken modest, affirmative steps toward accommodation, 32 or even whether the access provided is adequate.
3
Given these conflicting interests, the question remains: When disabled Medicaid managed care patients are denied care, what remedies are available to them under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act? This Comment explores the potential causes of action a disabled Medicaid managed care patient has under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act and whether a denial of care, under recent federal court interpretations, constitutes a lack of meaningful access. Part I looks at the problems presented by Medicaid managed care and the HealthChoices program in Pennsylvania. Part II discusses the stated purposes of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and whether the two acts even contemplate such a suit. Part III explores the specific titles of the 27 See infra Parts IV-V (discussing the requirement that a plaintiff show a deprivation of meaningful access in order to have an actionable claim, and the multitude of court opinions interpreting "meaningful access").
H 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (holding that health benefits "cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled"). ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and the potential suits that Medicaid patients could bring under each. Part IV analyzes Alexander v. Choate and the establishment of the "meaningful access" test. Part V investigates recent federal court rulings for interpretations of "meaningful access" in both the health care arena and other contexts. Finally, Part VI argues for a more expansive reading of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the abandonment of numerous threshold barriers to bringing suit, and a more workable definition of meaningful access in light of the goals of the ADA.
I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED BY MCOs AND "HEALTHCHOICES"
At the same time that Congress has responded to demands for increasing rights for the disabled, the government has been under increasing pressure to reduce health care costs. Rising health care costs resulting from technological advances, an aging population, and new diseases, combined with the unpopularity of the Medicaid entitlement, have prompted both the federal and state governments to adopt Medicaid managed care programs.
34
In Pennsylvania, this has resulted in the implementation of the "HealthChoices" program for Medicaid recipients. 
39
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (1994) (mandating that a Medicaid program's enrollment of a patient in a health system "shall not restrict the choice of the qualified person from whom the individual may receive services").
restrict care to doctors in their individual networks, 4° in order to implement HealthChoices, Pennsylvania had to obtain a waiver of this provision. 41 The implementation of HealthChoices in Pennsylvania has not been smooth. For example, the reimbursement rates HealthChoices MCOs pay for prescriptions to pharmacies are so low that two of the Philadelphia area's largest chains, CVS and Eckerd, will not fill HealthChoices prescriptions, and almost half of the independent pharmacies in the area have been forced to close since the implementation of HealthChoices.
42 Also, patients in rural counties may be unable to see their primary care physicians, because some areas lack transportation for doctors in other counties, and there is a dearth of doctors in outlying counties participating in particular MCO plans. 43 Further, there are problems with MCOs assigning non-Englishspeaking patients to doctors who only speak English.
The main problem that managed care programs like HealthChoices present, of course, is that in their mission to cut costs, they inevitably cut the amount and quality of services, and this significantly affects the disabled. Not only do MCOs give physicians a financial incentive to restrict the care they provide, 44 but MCOs themselves attempt to discourage enrollment of persons with serious illnesses. 45 The motivation for this is clear: " '46 In a traditional managed care program, an insurer can contain its costs by keeping patients healthy through preventative health care. This strategy fails, however, when the patients have preexisting, chronic medical needs. 4 7 The role of the primary care physician as a "gatekeeper"--to limit access to expensive, specialized care-is also incompatible with the treatment of the disabled, because the disabled have greater need for specialists than the general population. 48 HealthChoices has a particularly significant effect on persons with severe disabilities such as AIDS, who often must leave their HIV-experienced doctors to receive care from a doctor in the HealthChoices program. 49 In more rural areas, where there might not even be one HIV-experienced doctor that is a member of a HealthChoices MCO, a person with AIDS could face a life-threatening lack of care.
Two lawsuits recently filed .against the Pennsylvania DPW further illustrate the limitations on care imposed by HealthChoices. In the first of these cases, Anderson v. Department of Public Welfare, a group of HealthChoices patients with mobility and visual impairments brought a class action suit under the ADA. 50 One of the Anderson plaintiffs was a wheelchair-bound Medicaid recipient whose HealthChoices MCO assigned him to a dentist's office that was inaccessible to the physically impaired. 51 Another plaintiff in the suit challenged the failure of the HealthChoices MCOs to nation"). Fortunately, the MCOs taking over state Medicaid programs do not generally have the option of rejecting patients.
6 Crossley, supra note 5, at 426. 47 See id. at 427 (noting that the principle of cost containment through preventative health care "is largely inapplicable to a population that includes many individuals with preestablished, long-term medical needs").
48 See id. at 428 (observing that "many persons with disabilities or chronic conditions have greater than average needs for specialist referrals").
Although it is almost a matter of common sense to consider AIDS as a disability, there is also a plethora of case law in support of this proposition. supply provider directories and member handbooks in Braille, large print, or audiotape for the visually impaired . In ruling on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the court concluded as a matter of law that for mobility-impaired patients, the HealthChoices program "does not comply with the minimum program accessibility regulations promulgated under Title II and Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act].
5 3 The court declined to rule on the claims of the visually impaired plaintiffs.
4
The court also denied the DPW's cross-motion for summary judgment in its entirety, which argued that the ADA cannot be used in cases of unintentional discrimination. 55 Although the DPW did not dispute Congress's intent to provide for a disparate impact cause of action, the DPW asserted that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting the disparate impact elements of the ADA. 56 The court specifically rejected these claims, recognizing that the "ADA is a congruent and proportionate response to unconstitutional discrimination against disabled individuals." ' In June 1998, the parties reached a settlement agreement in which the DPW agreed to hire an organization to evaluate all HealthChoices providers for their accessibility to the disabled, and based on the results of the study, the DPW would ensure that the providers removed the barriers or the DPW would discontinue the use of the provider.5 8 In addition, the DPW agreed to furnish provider directories and member handbooks in all three of the formats that the plaintiffs requested, although the DPW could limit the directory by zip code.
59
In another suit, Metts v. Houstoun, the plaintiffs alleged that the HealthChoices HMOs failed to provide adequate notice for reductions or denials of care. 60 Rather than receiving written notices explaining the rea- for the reductions or denials and the process for appealing these decisions, the plaintiffs received only oral notifications, perfunctory written notifications, or no notice whatsoever. 61 As a result, Medicaid recipients were unaware that if they appealed the decision within ten days, they would still be able to receive benefits, pending the outcome of the appeal. Even if they were aware of their ability to appeal, without knowing the grounds for the denials, they did not know what to argue.
Metts also brings to light another incompatibility between managed care and care for the disabled. The plaintiffs in Metts challenged the HealthChoices MCOs' practice of denying care for services that the MCOs deemed "custodial"--that is, continual care for persons with chronic dis-62 abilities. The MCOs denied care to some Medicaid patients on the ground that the patients' conditions would not improve with treatment, despite the fact that treatment was needed just to maintain their conditions. 6 1 This is not an uncommon practice among MCOs-often, "MCOs' definitions of medical necessity.., focus on whether the service will improve or restore function .... [and] is biased toward providing curative care, rather than meeting the maintenance or developmental needs of many persons with disabilities. ' '64 Another practice that the Metts plaintiffs challenged was HealthChoices MCOs basing some of their decisions to deny care on general statistics, rather than on an individualized determination of each patient's needs. If a patient did not improve to the extent that someone with the patient's condition typically did, the MCO was apt to discontinue treatment. 65 As in Anderson, the parties in Metts were eventually able to come to a settlement; the DPW agreed to improve its notice system, to revise its criteria for making coverage determinations, and to evaluate patients' needs on a more individualized basis. 66 As long as the financial incentives exist for MCOs to limit care, however, new methods of limitation will likely arise, and the need for legal remedies will persist.
These examples point to one simple conclusion: Managed care programs cause deficiencies in care for disabled persons. Perhaps tautologically, the pressure to reduce funding will result in less care, and thus, those who will be the most greatly affected are the disabled. The question then becomes what remedy the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act provides.
II. PURPOSES OF THE ADA AND THE REHABILITATION ACT
The stated purposes of the acts themselves serve as a relevant starting point. The ADA purports to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities., 67 The ADA is a much-needed remedy for persons with disabilities, and it is a powerful remedy when blatant, malicious discrimination occurs in the workplace, government services, or public accommodations.
68
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 partly to combat some of the deficiencies of its predecessor, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.69 The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled by organizations receiving federal funding. Its mandate consists of a single sentence: "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... ,70 Discrimination against disabled persons occurs in vastly broader circumstances than these, however, and section 504 has been ineffectively enforced by many government agencies charged with its enforcement. 71 As a result, Congress recognized in the late 1980s that the Rehabilitation Act was "inadequate to combat the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are facing. ADA, finally enacting it on July 26, 1990. 73 Of particular import to Medicaid recipients is the fact that the ADA specifically addresses discrimination in health care. "It makes no sense to bar discrimination against people with disabilities in theaters, restaurants, or places of entertainment but not in regard to such important things as doctor's offices." 74 The two acts are more comprehensive than this, however. In passing these acts, Congress recognized that disabled individuals face not only discrimination motivated by invidious intent, but also discrimination that has a disparate impact on disabled persons. As a House of Representatives report recognized: "Discrimination often results from false presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious mythologies." 75 The two acts contain provisions that specifically address this form of discrimination. The regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act, for instance, state that a recipient of federal funds may not... utilize criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of handicap [or] (ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's program with respect to handicapped persons. 76 Similarly, the ADA prohibits "the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
77 Discrimination that is not motivated by animosity is still discrimination, and these provisions clearly attempt to reduce its effect. Nevertheless, the acts cannot eliminate all discrimination, nor can they guarantee that disabled persons will always receive the same result as the nondisabled. As a House of Representatives report recognized: "'Full and equal enjoyment' does not encompass the notion that persons with disabili- ties must achieve the identical result or level of achievement of nondisabled persons ... ,, 78 The question remains where to draw the line, between prohibiting all disparate impact discrimination and prohibiting only invidious discrimination.
The courts have wrestled with this issue and have not reached a consensus. For example, in Helen L. v. DiDario, the Third Circuit recognized that
[b]ecause the ADA evolved from an attempt to remedy the effects of "benign neglect" resulting from the "invisibility" of the disabled, Congress could not have intended to limit the Act's protections and prohibitions to circumstances involving deliberate discrimination.... Rather, the ADA attempts to eliminate the effects of that "benign neglect," "apathy," and "indifference." 79 In contrast, in DeBord v. Board of Education, the Eighth Circuit upheld a regulation on the ground that "[t]he policy is neutral; it applies to all students regardless of disability," 80 despite the fact that the regulation primarily affected disabled students.
This Comment argues that courts should expand their recognition of disparate impact claims in the Medicaid managed care context.81 Congress recognized that "[t]he discriminatory nature of policies and practices that exclude and segregate disabled people has been obscured by the unchallenged equation of disability with incapacity and by the gloss of 'good intentions.', 8 2 Upholding discriminatory, yet facially neutral, health care regulations will only legitimate the gloss of good intentions. (9th Cir. 1996) ("Congress intended to prohibit outright discrimination, as well as those forms of discrimination which deny disabled persons public services disproportionately due to their disability."); Weber, supra note 18, at 1118 (observing that under the ADA, "[p]rohibitions extend to intentional discrimination as well as practices that have an unintended negative impact on persons with disabilities" (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1), (3), (6)- (7) 87 One initial threshold problem in bringing a suit against an MCO is the ADA's "safe harbor" provision. According to section 501(c) of the ADA, Titles I, II, and III are not meant to prohibit or restrict insurers from carrying 83 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994) (defining "public entity"). 94 See id. § 12181(7) (defining public accommodations to include, inter alia, restaurants, bars, grocery stores, inns, terminals, and laundromats).
See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (indicating that no otherwise qualified person with a disability shall be denied the benefits of any program or activity receiving federal assistance).
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4), (8) (defining terms such as "employee" and "qualified individual with disability"). 87 One commentator suggests that courts should consider MCOs to be employers because employers are "covered entities" under the ADA and because the statute prohibits discrimination by 'an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of a covered entity. out traditional risk classification practices. 88 Under the strictest interpretation of this provision, some courts have held that insurance companies cannot be sued under the ADA. 8 9 On the other hand, an additional clause in Title IV provides that the safe harbor provision "shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter. ' 90 Taken to an extreme, this provision appears to state that insurance companies will not be held liable for violating the ADA unless they actually attempt to do so. The ambiguity of this section has been interpreted by the Sixth Circuit as being "purposefully vague in order to satisfy contending interest groups."
91 With the exception of Title II cases, discussed below in Part III.A, the safe harbor provision consequently has not proven itself to be an effective bar to suits against insurance companies.
Part of the confusion arising from the safe harbor provision is the meaning of the term "subterfuge." Although the ADA appears to permit some degree of latitude for insurers to make risk assessments, it is uncertain exactly where the line is drawn between valid risk assessment and invalid subterfuge. Clearly, an insurer cannot completely deny health care to a person with a disability on the basis of "risk assessment." As one court put it, the safe harbor provision "does not apply to situations where an individual with a disability has been totally denied coverage of any kind.
9 2 Beyond this extreme, however, courts are in disagreement. In Conner v. Colony Lake Lure, for instance, a district court placed a heavy burden on the plaintiff to prove that an insurance plan was a subterfuge.
93 "[A] benefit plan cannot be a 'subterfuge' unless the employer intended by virtue of the plan to discriminate in a non-fringe-benefit-related aspect of the employment relation." 94 ance plan was not a subterfuge, and the court asserted that a specific showing of intent was not necessary to demonstrate subterfuge. 95 "The term subterfuge 'simply[] denote[s] a means of evading the purposes of the ADA .... It does not mean that there must be some malicious intent to evade the ADA on the part of the insurance company .... ,,,96 As a result, the safe harbor provision predictably "has been the source of a lot of confusion." 97 The unpredictable nature of the safe harbor provision makes a plaintiffs potential suit against a Medicaid MCO uncertain. If the plaintiff is in a jurisdiction that construes the safe harbor provision so as to block Title II suits against MCOs, she may want to abandon suing the MCO altogether and sue the state instead. Each of the potential causes of action under the different titles of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are discussed below.
A. Title I of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Public Entities
A Medicaid recipient's ability to bring suit against the state under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA perhaps presents the greatest promise for success. In Helen L. v. DiDario, for instance, the Third Circuit recognized a Title II suit against the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare when the department required that the plaintiffs receive care in a nursing home rather than in their own homes. 98 One of the regulations implementing the ADA requires that a public entity provide services 95 924 F. Supp. at 769-70, 779, 781 (finding that absent the defense of undue hardship, an employer violated the ADA by switching from a high-premium health plan that covered an HIV-positive employee to a low-premium health plan that excluded the employee, and asserting that " [t] he ADA puts the burden on those actors classifying risks to show both their rationality and permissibility"). A suit under Title II, unlike those under Titles I and III, has the added advantage of not requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
1 0 2 As a result, a plaintiff is less likely to run afoul of procedural problems with the state's administrative appeals process and will potentially receive faster relief.
In addition, courts have held that the state itself cannot escape responsibility just by delegating its authority. For instance, the District Court of Arizona asserted that "[i]t is patently unreasonable to presume that Congress would permit a state to disclaim federal responsibilities by contracting away its obligations to a private entity."' 0 3
Although the state itself can be held liable, the question whether an MCO with whom the state has contracted can be held responsible under the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA is much less certain. An MCO implementing a Medicaid program is arguably an "instrumentality" of the state, which is specifically included in the definition of "public entity" in Because the "subterfuge" exception does not apply in Title II cases, the court concluded that all suits against insurers were barred.1 0 8 The court acknowledged that the legislative history supported the application of the subterfuge exception to Title II cases, but because the plain terms of the statute do not include Title II, the court dismissed the case. One potential way to avoid the problem the safe harbor provision presents for Title II suits is to challenge an insurer's actions under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Because Medicaid MCOs by definition receive federal funds, and the Rehabilitation Act applies to all federally funded programs and activities, an MCO could be responsible under the Rehabilitation Act.10 Alternatively, the plaintiffs could sue under Title III of the ADA, as discussed in the next Subpart. A plaintiffs ability to bring a suit against a managed care organization under Title III of the ADA depends in large part on the court in which the plaintiff brings the case. On the one hand, Title III of the ADA establishes the broad mandate that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation .... 111 The House Reports accompanying the ADA assert that the purpose of Title III is "to bring individuals with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life.... in a clear, balanced, and reasonable manner."
'1 2 Given this mandate and intention, it follows that a disabled individual should be able to challenge discriminatory practices of insurance companies that keep her out of the economic and social mainstream. On the other hand, several courts have been unwilling to interpret "public accommodation" to include insurance companies. Currently, the First Circuit is the only federal court of appeals that has accepted this interpretation.
In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass 'n, the First Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of a suit against a health plan. 113 The suit challenged the health plan's lifetime cap on benefits for persons with AIDS.! 4 The court rejected both the district court's view that a "public accommodation" must be a physical structure and the argument that because patients dealing with insurance companies typically did so over the phone, insurance companies were not public accommodations."
5 Instead, the court reasoned that the terms of Title III itself did not require physical structures, and that the example of "travel service" among Title III's list of accommodations indicated that Congress contemplated nonphysical structures. "It would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail are not. Congress could not have intended such an absurd result."' 114 See id. at 14 (discussing challenges to the validity of a $25,000 lifetime benefits cap for AIDS-related illnesses).
15 See id. at 19 (holding that establishments of "public accommodation" are not "limited to actual physical structures"). 116 
Id.
To exclude this broad category of businesses from the reach of Title III and limit the application of Title III to physical structures which persons must enter to obtain goods and services would run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and would severely Nevertheless, numerous courts have reached just that result. In Pappas v. Bethesda Hospital Ass'n, for example, an employee brought suit under Title III against a hospital association after she was denied health coverage for her family 1 17 The court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the hospital association fell under Title III, reasoning that "the references throughout Title III make it clear that its scope is limited to discrimination in the provisions of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations based on a disabled person's physical ability to make use of those goods, services, etc." 118 The court also rejected the Department of Justice's interpretation of the statute, which suggested that the discriminatory sale of insurance contracts falls under Title III, on the grounds that the Department of Justice opinion was only suggestive authority.
1 19 Instead, given the lack of case law on the subject, the court reasoned that it must construe the terms of the ADA narrowly--"based on the 'ordinary, common meaning of the words in the statute."' 120 The court concluded that the most ordinary meaning of "public accommodation" is a physical location. 1") , concluding that because Title III covered "goods" and "services," a person did not have to enter a structure in order to use a public accommodation. 122 The Sixth Circuit, however, later reversed the opinion en banc ("Parker I1") on the grounds that "[a] benefit plan offered by an employer is not a good offered by a place of public accommodation." 123 Because Parker obtained her benefits from her employer, rather than seeking out an insurance office on her own, there was no "nexus" to a frustrate Congress's intent that individuals with disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the general public.
Id. at 20. 117 861 F. Supp. 616, 617 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (noting that the defendant refused to provide health care to both the plaintiff's husband, who had hypertension and hyperlipidemia, and to the plaintiff's son, who was a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair). This "narrow" reading of the ADA is in direct contrast to the Parker I court's finding that because the ADA is a remedial statute, its terms should be "interpreted broadly, in a manner consistent with their stated goal.' 27 Some courts have reached the same conclusion as the Parker I court, however, reasoning that "[u]nlike other legislation designed to settle narrow issues of law, the ADA has a comprehensive reach and should be interpreted with this goal in mind. 128 Under this broader reading, in Baker v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., a district court asserted that "the ADA does not require a plaintiff to be physically present at the place of public accommodation to be entitled to non-discriminatory treatment." 129 A child brought suit in Baker against an insurance company when it refused to cover him because he suffered from a seizure disorder. 30 In denying the defendant's motion for dismissal, the court observed that "discrimination can occur... when a plaintiff is not physically present at the place of public accommodation and only has contact with that place ... by telephone and correspondence."1 perhaps the clearest reason to permit a suit against an insurance company under Title III: insurance companies would not need the safe harbor provision under Title III if the Title was inapplicable to insurance companies. 133 Further, the court asserted that even under the "narrow" readings of the ADA, which the courts in Parker 11 and Pappas espoused, the plain language of the ADA simply does not mandate that only physical accommodations are covered. Given the broad-ranging purposes of the ADA to end "discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities," it would make little sense to remove such a large portion of the discrimination from the scope of the ADA. 134 Further, because the ADA protects not only the disabled, but also those with a record of a disability and those who are perceived as disabled, Title III would have little meaning for these groups if it applied only to physical places. 135 The issue of the applicability of Title III to insurance companies is still unsettled, but two subsequent cases have followed Kotev, 13 6 increasing the possibility that the Pappas and Parker II opinions will eventually lose their authority.
Ila

IV. ALEXANDER V. CHOATE AND "MEANINGFUL ACCESS"
The main obstacle to using the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act to challenge a state or managed care organization's limitation on Medicaid benefits is a 1985 Supreme Court case, Alexander v. Choate. 137 In Choate, disabled Medicaid recipients challenged a reduction in the maximum annual hospital days that the State of Tennessee would reimburse. The state reduced the number of annual inpatient hospital days for which Medicaid would pay hospitals from twenty to fourteen. 138 The plaintiffs argued that this policy change had a disproportionate effect on the disabled, in violation of, among other things, the Rehabilitation Act. 139 The Court recognized the problem of noninvidious discrimination against the disabled, and stated that "much of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the Act construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent.
' '140 Nevertheless, the Court, when balancing the medical needs of the disabled with the financial burdens of the state, found that the cap on hospital inpatient days did not violate the Rehabilitation Act. 141 The decisive element in the balancing test, according to the Court, was that the plaintiffs were not deprived of "meaningful access."' 142 The establishment of a "meaningful access" analysis is the crucial element of the Choate opinion. In its attempt to balance the needs of the state against the needs of the plaintiffs, the Court asserted that the existence or lack of meaningful access was the relevant inquiry, although neither this standard nor this terminology appears in the Rehabilitation Act itself. "[A]n otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers.... [T]o assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit may have to be made."' 143 In finding that the plaintiffs had meaningful access to health care, the Court cited three relevant factors: first, the fourteen-day limitation did not "invoke criteria that have a particular exclusionary effect" on the disabled; second, the cap was "neutral on its face," because it did not base the determination of who would be covered on any test that the disabled were less capable of meeting; and third, "nothing in the record suggest[ed] that the handicapped... [would] be unable to benefit meaningfully from the coverage they [would] receive under the 14-day rule."' 144 The lack of a "particular exclusionary effect" that the Court referred to was the district court's finding that 95% of the disabled plaintiffs on Medi-139 See id. at 290. 140 Id. at 296-97. "Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect." Id. at 295; see also supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's recognition, in its enactment of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, of disparate impact discrimination against the disabled).
141 See Choate, 469 U.S. at 300 (asserting that the appropriate inquiry is a balancing test "between the statutory rights of the handicapped to be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their programs," and explaining that "while a grantee need not be required to make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to make 'reasonable' ones"). 142 Id. at 301. 143 Id. at 301. 144 Id. at 302.
caid probably would be covered fully under the fourteen-day plan. 145 Yet, the record also contained data suggesting that in a recent year, 27% of the disabled patients using inpatient services needed more than fourteen days of care, while only 8% of the nondisabled that required hospitalization needed more than fourteen days. 146 That is, disabled hospital patients were more than three times as likely to be affected by the reduction in care than the nondisabled hospital patients. A finding of whether there is an "exclusionary effect" may therefore depend upon which statistics a court uses in its analysis. At any rate, all that one can glean from this particular part of the analysis is that when only 5% of a group of plaintiffs are affected by a regulation, the exclusionary effect may be insufficient to constitute a lack of meaningful access. The Court's examination of the "facial neutrality" of the regulation is troublesome, because the plaintiffs brought the suit as a disparate impact cause of action.
147 That is, the plaintiffs recognized that there was no invidious provision in the regulation that singled out the disabled, but alleged that its disparate effect on them produced an actionable claim. The Court initially recognized that facially neutral regulations could have a disparate impact on the disabled. 148 Given that a per se rule against disparate impact discrimination "could lead to a wholly unwieldy administrative and adjudicative burden," however, the Court reasoned that some limit would have to be imposed. 149 As a result, the Court concluded that only "conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped" constitutes a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. 15 In order to determine whether there is an "unjustifiable disparate impact," the relevant inquiry is whether "the reduction, neutral on its face, . . . distinguish[es] between those whose coverage will be reduced and those whose coverage will not on the basis of any" classification based on disability. 15 Put simply, a facially neutral regulation is justifiable if it is facially neutral. This tautology has not helped the lower 145 See id. at 303. 146 See id. at 289-90. 147 See Choate, 469 U.S. at 289 (noting that the plaintiffs alleged that the regulations would have a "discriminatory effect on the handicapped"); see also supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (discussing disparate impact).
14 See Choate, 469 U.S. at 295-97 (describing how actions that lack a discriminatory intent may nonetheless have an inadvertent discriminatory result). 149 Id. at 298.
courts to produce consistent decisions, and some have gone so far as to find that meaningful access exists when a regulation is facially neutral.
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The Court's reasoning that nothing in the record suggested that the plaintiffs would not "benefit meaningfully" is also a bit problematic, because the term "meaningful" is used to explain the term "meaningful.' 153 This factor does suggest that a plaintiff must have a strong evidentiary showing of a deprivation of access to succeed. Many lower courts, perhaps because of this ground for the decision, have held that unless there is a total deprivation of a benefit, a plaintiff still has meaningful access. From the facts of Choate, it is clear that when 95% of beneficiaries have access to a program, and the regulation does not specifically single out a protected group, meaningful access exists.' 55 Outside these particular facts, however, courts have resolved the question of the definition of "meaningful access" inconsistently. Given the circular reasoning in the Court's analysis, the three elements of the meaningful access analysis are virtually impossible to apply to other circumstances. Some courts have based their analyses on whether the challenged policy is facially neutral.
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Others have examined whether the challenged policy results in a particular exclusionary effect.1 57 But for the majority of lower court decisions, the determination whether "meaningful access" exists is at the judge's discretion. The next Part explores the many different interpretations that courts have expounded.
V. WHAT CONSTITUTES MEANINGFUL ACCESS?
The question regarding what constitutes meaningful access to health care under the ADA has not been resolved in the lower courts. The case law addressing the issue is not overly extensive because the ADA took full ef- fect only in 1992. Moreover, early cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act construed it narrowly, thereby discouraging subsequent suits. 58 The following Subpart examines the district court decisions that address the issue of meaningful access and attempts to position them on a spectrum between the extremes of "any access" and "adequate access." The second Subpart discusses some of the ways that courts, recognizing the ambiguous state of the law, have attempted to avoid the question altogether.
A. The Spectrum of Decisions on MeaningfulAccess for Disabled Persons
The lack of a more specific holding in Choate has resulted in a series of district court opinions in substantial disarray. Recall that the Court in Alexander v. Choate cited three factors in its determination of meaningful access: (1) whether the challenged regulation had a particular exclusionary effect on the disabled; (2) whether the regulation was neutral on its face; and (3) whether anything suggested that the disabled would be unable to benefit meaningfully.
1 59 Courts occasionally have cited the first factor, but given that one cannot discern from Choate how much of an exclusionary effect is necessary to have a deprivation of meaningful access, the first factor is not particularly illuminating. The second factor is problematic because, as discussed earlier, when a plaintiff alleges that noninvidious, disparate impact discrimination has taken place, one would expect the regulation to be facially neutral. The third factor is clearly circular and provides no guidance. As a result, district courts have produced a variety of opinions.
The holding of Choate, that a state is not required to provide "adequate health care," 160 remains good law. As a result, many courts have construed "meaningful access" to mean any access. That is, if a recipient receives any benefit whatsoever, the access is meaningful. Under this analysis, a court could conclude that a Medicaid recipient had "meaningful access" just by receiving Medicaid. Some courts have backed away from this absolutist approach, however, and have found violations of meaningful access in situations ranging from when a benefit is "effectively unavailable" to when access is "difficult or extremely inadequate," and even just "inadequate," potentially conflicting with Choate.
158 See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 58 (noting that the narrow interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act by federal appellate courts could have discouraged later claims).
159 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 (1985) ; supra Part IV (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Choate and its establishment of the "meaningful access" analysis).16 o 10Choate, 469 U.S. at 303.
Meaningful Access as Any Access
At the far end of the spectrum are several holdings that suggest that there must be a total deprivation of access before meaningful access is compromised. In Frances J. v. Bradley, for instance, a district court found no violation of the Rehabilitation Act when the State declined to fund home care for mentally disabled elderly plaintiffs. 161 Instead, the plaintiffs received care at a facility. Reasoning that the plaintiffs were "not being absolutely excluded from the program," the court found that they were "not being deprived of meaningful access to these benefits." 162 The Eleventh Circuit took a similar approach, but found for the plaintiffs, in United States v. Board of Trustees for the University ofAlabama. 163 In that case, the court found that when the University of Alabama refused to provide sign language interpreters for its deaf students, the students were deprived of meaningful access under the Rehabilitation Act. 164 "In the case of a deaf student,... all access to the benefit of some courses is eliminated when no sign-language interpreter is present." 65 Since total lack of access is not meaningful access, the court held that the University was in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
Carried to its extreme, the absolutist approach can have some troubling results. In Slager v. Duncan, for instance, the plaintiff sued the county in which he lived under the ADA, seeking an injunction to block the installation of speed bumps his street. 166 The plaintiff suffered from a spinal injury that made driving over speed bumps very painful. Nevertheless, reasoning that the bumps "do not totally bar his use of the roads or leave him entirely 'unable to benefit meaningfully' from the streets .... he has not been denied 'meaningful access."' 167 Thus, even though the "access" caused the plaintiff severe pain, painful access is still "meaningful." 167 Id. at *2.
The Extreme Approach, but with Recognition of the Need for Effective Treatment
In another case, a district court also took an absolutist approach, but expressed some hesitation in using such a strict definition. In Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Center v. City of West Palm Beach, parents of disabled persons sued after the city chose to terminate recreational programs for the disabled. 168 In the wake of budget cuts, the city completely eliminated the programs for disabled persons, but continued numerous programs for the general population. 169 Recognizing that a complete absence of access was a deprivation of meaningful access, the court found that the city violated the ADA.1 70 The court also recognized that the city did not have to provide services to anyone, but that if it provided programs for the general population, it had to make provisions for the disabled.1 7 '
The difference between this case and the other absolutist cases cited is that this court recognized that sometimes different or separate benefits must be provided in order to have the same effect. " [T] he ADA contemplates that different or separate benefits or services be provided if they are 'necessary to provide qualified individuals with disabilities with aids, benefits, or services that are as effective as those provided to others." '1 7 2 That is, the court implicitly suggested that there might be a deprivation of meaningful access when a regulation does not provide services that are as effective as those provided to the general population. "Ineffective" is closely related to "inadequate," which the Choate court rejected as a determination of meaningful access. The Concerned Parents court also specifically stated, however, that "adequate" recreational programs were not required under the ADA, 173 and took the absolutist approach in its holding. 169 See id. at 989. 170 See id. at 992 ("When these programs were eliminated, Plaintiffs were denied the benefits of the City's leisure services in contravention of Title II."). 171 See id. at 990 n.11 ("mhe ADA does not require that persons with disabilities be given 'adequate recreational programs' or, for that matter, any recreational programs. However, the ADA does require that persons with disabilities be given equal access to whatever benefits the City offers to persons without disabilities." (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,303 (1985))).
172 Id. at 991 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (1993)). 173 See id. at 990 n.11 ("[Tihe ADA does not require that persons with disabilities be given 'adequate recreational programs' or... any recreational programs."). make adjustments to its program-that the plaintiffs received some benefits, or that the city imposed delays on all Medicaid recipients alike, could not justify the delays.
Nevertheless, the Henrietta D. court was skeptical of the plaintiffs' ultimate success in proving a lack of meaningful access. Although the court recognized the potentially life-threatening problems with the policies of the DAS, the court also found that the DAS attempted to expedite the claims of some plaintiffs, provided cash supplements unavailable to persons without HIV, and required fewer visits to the city welfare offices.1 81 As a result, the court found that "plaintiffs are not likely to succeed in proving that DAS ... does not or will not... [provide] beneficiaries [with] meaningful and equal access .... ,,182 Thus, despite its recognition of an affirmative obligation to accommodate special needs, the court appeared to indicate that meaningful access exists when the state has made modest affirmative steps at accommodation, even if those steps are inadequate. Because the court was ruling only on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, however, the court denied the defendants' motion. 
Meaningful Access as Readily Accessible
Beyond the absolutist and individualized inquiry standards, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has suggested a "readily accessible" standard for determining whether there is meaningful access. In Peoples v. Nix, a blind attorney challenged Rule 120 of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, which required a party to appear in court to obtain a default judgment even when the other party failed to appear.18 4 The court recognized the ambiguity in the definition of "meaningful access," examining definitions such as "a right to use that has function or purpose," "[a] service that is readily accessible [and] promptly and easily obtained," and something that is "convenient or conducive" to performing a job. 185 Without settling on one particular definition, the court concluded that a determination regarding whether Rule 120 deprived blind persons of meaningful access to the courts would require a complete factual record and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.1 86 181 See id. at *10 (describing the way in which the DAS assisted some of its clients). Nevertheless, the court at least implicitly recognized that meaningful access requires more than the mere presence of access.
Another district court reached a similar conclusion in Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Greenfield. 87 In Oconomowoc, developmentally disabled persons seeking to live in group homes claimed that a zoning ordinance prohibiting the location of two group homes within 2500 feet of each other violated the ADA. 188 The Court agreed, reasoning that as a remedial law, the ADA should be "construed broadly to ensure that disabled people are not denied meaningful access to housing or to public services or accommodations."' 89 Despite the fact that the disabled persons could have stayed in homes that were more spread out, the court found that the "spacing requirement substantially limits meaningful access to housing."
190 Nevertheless, Oconomowoc is a little ambiguous in its use of the term "meaningful access." The court held that the restriction limited meaningful access, rather than just "access," but the court found a violation of the ADA when access clearly would have been less readily available to the disabled, suggesting a standard similar to that put forth in Nix.
Meaningful Access if No Particular Exclusionary Effect
The clearest part of the Alexander v. Choate meaningful access analysis, whether the challenged regulation results in a particular exclusionary effect, is used occasionally by courts to make their determinations of meaningful access. In Thrope v. Ohio, for instance, a district court considered a challenge to a $5.00 fee that the state charged for handicapped parking windshield placards. 91 The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, concluding that the fee was "an illegal surcharge under the ADA. 192 The State argued that the fee was permissible, because disabled persons had the option of getting a handicapped license plate instead, at no cost. 193 The court rejected this argument because in order to obtain special license plates, one would have to own or lease a vehicle, and not all disabled drivers owned or leased cars. "The license plate 'option' alone provides 187 193 See id. (citing the State's contention that the placards are "only one alternative available to disabled Ohio drivers to permit them to utilize-handicapped-reserved parking spaces").
meaningful access to only a subset of disabled Ohioans (those who drive their own cars 100% of the time), and is thus at odds with the ADA." '1 94 The Thrope analysis is notable because it, unlike the majority of other meaningful access analyses discussed in this Subpart, utilized one of the factors cited by the Choate Court-a particular exclusionary effect on the disabled. In Choate, the Supreme Court concluded that when 95% of the disabled Medicaid patients would probably be fully covered under the state's revised health care plan, there was no particular exclusionary effect.1 9 5 But, the Choate Court failed to provide guidelines that were any more specific-where 95% of the plaintiffs are covered, there is meaningful access, but what about 94% or 93%? Unfortunately, Thrope did not help to clear up this ambiguity. The court cites no statistics as to how many disabled persons neither owned nor leased cars but still needed handicapped placards. If one assumes that the percentage is small, the Thrope holding becomes stronger, as a deprivation of access to a small portion of the group would constitute a lack of meaningful access.
Lack of Meaningful Access forDifficulty or Extreme Inadequacy
Moving even further along the spectrum from "readily accessible," another court has suggested that there is a deprivation of meaningful access when the benefit in question is too difficult to obtain or extremely inadequate. In Bonner v. Lewis, a deaf and mute inmate at the Arizona state prison sued under the Rehabilitation Act when the prison failed to provide him with a sign language interpreter.
19 6 As a result, he found it extremely hard to communicate in counseling sessions, in administrative and disciplinary hearings, and while receiving medical treatment.
19 7 The prison provided a telecommunication device so that the prison officials could communicate with the plaintiff, and some of the other inmates had a limited knowledge of sign language.1 8 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit found that the factual question whether the communication was "extremely difficult and inadequate" was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and reversed the district court's summary judgment decision for the defendant. 199 This suggests a significantly more probing analysis of meaningful access than in the prior cases.
Meaningful Access as Adequate Access
At the far end of the spectrum is World Insurance Co. v. Branch, where the Northern District of Georgia implicitly suggested that there was a violation of meaningful access when access was inadequate. 2°0 In Branch, Ralph
Branch, a person with AIDS, challenged his health insurance company's $5000 lifetime cap on AIDS benefits. In granting summary judgment for Branch, the court reasoned that "[b]ecause access to adequate health care is often integral to a disabled individual's ability to participate in society, the court cannot imagine that an insurer could arbitrarily cap the benefits payable with respect to a particular disability without running afoul of this stated purpose." 20 1 The court did not specifically state that in order to have meaningful access, one must have adequate access; rather, it used the fact that there was inadequate access to explain why the safe harbor provision did not apply. 202 Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment for Branch, so there must have been a violation of meaningful access. It would make little sense to assert that an insurance company could not provide "inadequate" access under the safe harbor provision, but then to reason that it could under the meaningful access test. Such a reading, however, flies in the face of Choate, and this case remains isolated.
B. Methods Courts Have Used to Avoid the Question Altogether
Beyond the considerable ambiguity in the term "meaningful access," courts have added to the complexity of the determination by deciding cases on other grounds. In addition to the threshold problems in bringing a cause of action addressed in Part III, federal courts have declined to permit suits in cases where the benefits at issue are "special" programs or where the challenged regulation is facially neutral. Facial neutrality is not included in the above discussion of interpretations of meaningful access, despite being a factor in the Choate court's analysis, because when courts have addressed it as an issue, they have used it to avoid examining whether meaningful access in fact exists. 202 See id. at 1209 ("IT]here is no evidence explaining the purpose for which plaintiff caps an insured's lifetime benefits for AIDS at $5000.").
"Special" Programs
When courts have found that a benefit program provided by the state is a "special" program, not available to the general public, they have generally declined to permit suits under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. For instance, in Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health & Hospital Corp., a district court granted a motion to dismiss a suit brought by disabled children when the State closed the New York rehabilitation clinic that they attended. 20 3 The clinic provided specialized services for developmentally disabled children, and after its closing, no equivalent facility was available to provide these services. Exactly what made these services "specialized," however, is unclear. Under this same rationale, a court could preclude Medicaid patients from ever bringing suit because the government does not provide Medicaid to the public at large, but rather a very small subset. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding. 207 See 147 F.3d at 168. Notably, the Second Circuit did not hold that the district court was correct in its finding that the state had no obligation to provide specialized programs. Instead, the court rested its decision on the plaintiffs' failure to raise the allegation that they were entitled to special services which the State denied them. See id. ("We need not decide whether, in some circumstances, a reasonable accommodation in the provision of medical care to a disabled person equal to that provided to a nondisabled person might have to include medical services that could be characterized as 'specialized."').
208 had given up tax deductions provided for disabled persons. Instead, the court reasoned that allowing the firefighter to retire as "disabled" was a specialized service, and so the ADA provided no protection: "In reality, plaintiff is seeking special rather than simply nondiscriminatory treatment. The City's failure to provide him with such special treatment does not violate the ADA." 210 By concluding that the plaintiffs ability to claim eligibility for tax benefits was special treatment by the city, the court never had to reach the issue regarding whether the city had deprived him of meaningful access. Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit reached a different conclusion about "special" services. In L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, the circuit court found that the state could not confine a disabled person in a state-run institution where the plaintiff could be more appropriately treated in an integrated community setting.
21 1 The plaintiff had been confined in a state psychiatric hospital where persons with mental disabilities were "cared for in a segregated environment." 212 In ruling that the state violated the ADA by keeping the plaintiff in the segregated setting, the court recognized:
The fact that L. Under this reasoning, the "special" services exception ceases to be an issue. The Eleventh Circuit decided Olmstead on April 8, 1998. It remains to be seen whether other jurisdictions will follow its example.
Facially Neutral Regulations
Another threshold inquiry that courts conduct is whether a regulation is "facially neutral." As discussed in Part IV, this analysis is problematic because the Choate Court itself conducted a somewhat circular analysis.
214
The test is also troublesome because under the ADA, disparate impact causes of action should allow for relief even when a regulation is facially 216 In DeBord, the school board refused to administer a prescription drug to a student with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder because the amount the doctor prescribed exceeded the recommended dosage in the Physicians' Desk Reference.
17
Despite the facts that the student's prescription was medically necessary and that the refusal by the school board to administer the prescription likely would mean that the student would have to leave school early in order to get the medication at home, the court found that there was no violation of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
21
Instead, because the regulation applied to all students, whether disabled or not, the court found the regulation to be nondiscriminatory. 219 The court looked to the form of the regulation, rather than to the effect, and thus never reached the issue of meaningful access.
Fortunately, other courts have refrained from employing this type of circular reasoning. For instance, in Peoples v. Nix, a blind plaintiff made a challenge to the Pennsylvania state court rule requiring attorneys to appear for all proceedings although the rule appeared reasonable "on its face." 22 0
The court reasoned that under a disparate impact analysis, the plaintiff may have had a viable challenge to the state's policies based on the effect of the regulation.
221
215 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (noting that Congress intended a disparate impact cause of action without envisioning a requirement of complete equality of outcorm) 26 See id. at 1105 ("There is no evidence that the school district had disabilities in mind when formulating or implementing its policy.... The policy is neutral; it applies to all students regardless of disability. A student's excess prescription, not the student's disability, prevents the student from receiving medication from the school nurse."). unconscionable. But even less extreme cases require redress, and a broader requirement of meaningful access under the ADA could provide that redress.
Courts also must consistently recognize a disparate impact cause of action; otherwise the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act will become toothless in the health care context. Although invidious discrimination against the disabled remains an unfortunate reality of American culture, particularly among persons with HIV and AIDS, a far more pervasive problem is the "benign neglect" caused by regulations that have a disparate impact on the disabled. The Choate Court recognized the harm caused by disparate impact discrimination, but then issued a holding that did nothing to combat the problem. If, as the Court asserted, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act "make[s] actionable the disparate impact challenged in this case," and if it was Congress's intent to combat discrimination that was "the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect, ''229 then the inescapable conclusion is that the courts should interpret the statutes to prohibit disparate impact discrimination to the fullest extent possible.
A more consistent recognition of a disparate impact cause of action will help satisfy the mandate of the ADA. There are obviously situations where disparate impact is not actionable, such as when criteria are used that "are necessary for the operation of the program." 230 On the other hand, not every classification will be vital to Medicaid's continued existence, and the ADA itself proscribes discrimination that "tend[s] to screen out an individual with a disability." 231 As one commentator notes, "[d]isparate impact discrimination occurs when a policy that is facially neutral with respect to a particular group nevertheless affects members of that group differently from others. 2 32 It is completely circular reasoning, then, to assert that a policy is nondiscriminatory because it is facially neutral, as the Choate Court does.
As it stands, the holding of Choate provides little guidance for a court evaluating an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim. Although its balancing test provides a logical starting point, the lack of guidance on the definition of "meaningful access" permits courts to arrive at virtually any conclusion in Medicaid cases. The wide spectrum of holdings on meaningful access demonstrates this clearly. In order for the law to have any consistency, courts should employ a uniform standard of meaningful access that is more in line with the goals of the two acts.
229 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 294-95 (1985) . 230 Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 58 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1993)). 231 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994) . 232 Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 57 n.44. insurance company not one as well? 238 Likewise, if the ADA covers "goods and services" of a public accommodation, why is physical entry onto the premises necessary? 2 3 9 And, as the Kotev court observed, why would insurance companies need the safe harbor provision under Title III if the Title was inapplicable to insurance companies? 240 Similarly, the state should not be able to escape responsibility for discriminatory practices against the disabled by contracting out its health care responsibilities, 241 or Title II would become a meaningless provision. 242 The "specialized programs" arguments that the courts adopted in Lincoln CERCPAC 243 and Felde 44 contravene the purposes of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and should be abandoned. It is certainly not the case that all programs must be continued, but the discontinuance of the program in Lincoln CERCPAC singled out a specific group of disabilities for noncoverage, when no alternative programs were available. The Felde decision, in turn, presented an absurd concept of "choice." If the plaintiff had "chosen" to accept the normal retirement provisions, he would have been ineligible for tax benefits-benefits that the government deemed necessary for disabled persons in order to put them on more equal footing in comparison to the nondisabled. 4 Mandating that he "choose" to give up his tax deductions in order to receive full retirement benefits is like asking a blind person to choose to give up a seeing eye dog.
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act have the potential to safeguard the rights and improve the quality of life of thousands of disabled persons. A narrow interpretation, however, will mean that this potential remains only a potential. Choate's basic holding, that a blanket cap on health care is not a deprivation of meaningful access, has been repeatedly upheld by courts, 246 but this holding overlooks the fact that treating the disabled and nondisabled exactly alike will not result in the same benefits for the two groups; otherwise, there would be no need for a Rehabilitation Act or an ADA. As David Orentlicher observed, "If we treat people in exactly the same way there will be greater hardship on some persons than on others."
247 Yet even if a blanket cap on benefits is not redressable, the unsettled nature of the definition of "meaningful access" leaves open the possibility of employing the two acts to redress some of the harms that managed care causes Medicaid recipients. If Congress truly enacted the ADA to combat the deficiencies of the Rehabilitation Act, as the Senate and the Third Circuit have noted, then courts should be able to expand on the holding of Choate. 248 A broad reading of meaningful access would accomplish this. 246 See, e.g., Parker II, 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that an employer did not violate the ADA by providing a long-term disability plan that contained longer benefits for employees who became disabled due to physical illness than for those who became disabled due to mental illness); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a two-year limit on mental health benefits in a long-term disability plan did not violate the ADA); Moddemo v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding a lifetime cap on mental health benefits under the Foreign Service Health Plan); see also supra note 155 (discussing King). 247 Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 77. Orentlicher further explains:
As the Supreme Court has observed, "[s]ometimes the greatest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly the same." For example, if all persons are denied leave for pregnancy, women suffer greater harm than men.
Consider another example involving two patients with appendicitis. One patient is otherwise healthy and will be ready for discharge from the hospital within five days of the appendectomy. The second patient has a coexisting medical problem (for example, diabetes) that causes recovery from the surgery to take ten days. If a health plan limited reimbursement across the board to seven days of hospitalization after surgery, the people with coexisting medical problems would be disadvantaged.
Sometimes we need to take people's differences into account when deciding how to treat them. To ensure that people are treated as equals, it is often necessary to treat people differently.
Id. at 77-78 (footnotes omitted).
248 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings of the Rehabilitation Act and Congress's intent to solve them with the ADA). Admittedly, this argument is more difficult to make with Title II, since Congress specifically chose to follow Choate's holding. "In the legislative history of [T]itle II, the congressional committees held
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the nationwide move to managed care has put the health of Medicaid recipients in the hands of companies that make every effort to reduce the amount of medical care. Programs like HealthChoices in Pennsylvania have resulted in, and continue to result in, reductions in quality and quantity of care. This has a disproportionate effect on the disabled.
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act offer much needed protection for the rights of the disabled, particularly in the context of Medicaid managed care. The ADA, in particular, has as its stated purposes the elimination of discrimination against the disabled and the placement of the disabled in the political and economic mainstream of American life. As a means for addressing discrimination in health care, Medicaid managed care recipients have potential remedies under either Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (both dealing with public services), or Title III of the ADA (public accommodations).
In promulgating these two acts, Congress recognized that much of the discrimination faced by the disabled is not just from invidious intent, but from benign neglect. In Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme Court established the analysis regarding whether "meaningful access" to a benefit exists as the central inquiry in noninvidious discrimination cases. How to make that determination, however, is unclear, and courts have produced a wide spectrum of cases interpreting meaningful access, ranging from any access to adequate access.
The broad range of decisions on meaningful access is indicative of the need for judicial recognition that the ADA requires the provision of meaningful access, where "meaningful" signifies more than just "basic" or "rudimentary" access and approaches something closer to "adequate" access. Particularly in light of the need for experimental treatments for persons with AIDS and HIV, a less firm resolve will have disastrous consequences. And, if only the most basic, rudimentary access is mandated, how does the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act put the disabled in the economic mainstream of society?
Reducing disparate impact discrimination is vital to providing meaningful access to health care to the disabled and is a stated goal of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Courts should properly enforce the acts. 2, at 84 (1990)). Nevertheless, given that Choate has not produced a coherent set of guidelines, it is not unreasonable to suggest that courts employ a consistent definition of "meaningful access" that is more in line with the purposes of the ADA.
